TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/election/44elect/44elect.010

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                                                                                April 28, 1947

THE CONGRESS

Challenge


THE PRESIDENCY
"Everything's Lovely"

    What was the President going to do about the phone strike?
Would he veto a tough labor bill? What about prices? What about
Henry Wallace? While the questions went unanswered, insouciant
Harry Truman ducked his regular press conference and had a week
of fun.

     He got off to a good start by buying the first poppy of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars' 1947 sale from six-year-old Saundra Fay
Hall, gave her in return a little silver sombrero he had picked
up in Mexico. Later that afternoon he drove over to the Bethesda
Naval Hospital to pin a Medal of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster on
ailing, aging former secretary of State Cordell Hull.

     He found time for everyone. Round-the-world Flyer Milton
Reynolds and crew came by to receive the President's
congratulations and give him a Reynolds ball-point pen.
Democratic bigwigs dropped in to talk politics. Said Jersey
City's Boss Frank Hague: "Everything's fine -- everything's
lovely."

     At week's end, the President drove through cheering crowds
to throw out the first ball at the postponed Senators-Yankees
baseball opener. To the consternation of newsmen who had billed
him as a southpaw, Harry Truman first tossed out a blooper with
his right arm, obligingly threw another with his left for the
cameramen. Then he settled back to sip a Coke in the bright
spring sunlight, unexpectedly popped up half an inning early for
the traditional seventh inning stretch. Final score: Yankees, 7;
Senators, 0.

     This week the President turned to graver matters. Everything
was still lovely, but for that troublesome cloud shadow on the
spring landscape -- high prices and the danger of a recession.
Speaking at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in
Manhattan's Waldorf-Astoria hotel, Harry Truman ringingly
reiterated his familiar formula for avoiding depression: "Prices
must be brought down." (Before leaving the capital, the President
had a new vaccination as a precaution against Manhattan's
smallpox scare.)

     He said little that he had not said before. He quoted
figures: house furnishings were up 23% above 1945; clothing up
24%; food up 31%; wholesale prices were even higher all along the
line. Once prices were lowered, he expected labor to do its part
by following his "counsel of moderation," farmers to keep
production high. Government could help best, he said, by keeping
taxes up, reducing the debt, holding fast to rent, export and
credit controls.

     Said the President: "Only if we maintain and increase our
prosperity can we expect other countries to recognize the full
merits of a free economy . . . the responsibility of preserving
our free enterprise system will continue to rest upon the joint
efforts of business, labor, the farmers and government."


THE CONGRESS
Challenge

     The American people had had enough, and the House knew it.
Labor's spring strike fever had given the nation a new fit of
chills. The Hose, even more constituent-conscious than labor-shy,
reacted with a stunning strike-curb bill, then clinched its
purpose by passing the measure by a stunning majority -- 308 to
107 -- plenty of votes to override a presidential veto. With the
215 Republicans, 93 Democrats broke ranks to vote for the bill.

     The 66-page measure struck in three directions: at the
national Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, at the Norris-LaGuardia
(anti-injunction) Act, at Communist influence in trade unions.
Its chief points were long, strong and sharp. They were nailed
down by stern rules and broad new definitions. The only kind of
"compulsory unionism" the bill permitted was the union shop, and
then only if a majority of the workers wanted it and the employer
himself had no objection. (Closed shop: only union members may be
hired. Union shop: workers must join the union after they are
hired.) The bill would safeguard both workers' and employers'
rights to speak out against unions. It would deprive workers of
the right to strike over anything but questions of wages, hours,
work requirements and work conditions; strikes over any question
of union security would be unfair labor practices. These rules
drastically revised the so-called "Magna Charta of Labor"-the
Wagner Act. By giving employers the right to ask for court
injunctions when confronted by an "unlawful strike," the bill
drastically revised the Norris-La Guardia Act. It attacked
Communist union influence by barring not only Communists, but
even ex-Communists and party-liners, from holding union office.

     Against Tyranny. The House's avowed aim was to bring an end
to "widespread industrial strife." That had also been the avowed
aim of Congress in 1935, when it passed the Wagner Act. But the
80th Congress now thought that the hard facts of industrial
strife had demonstrated the fallacy in congressional thinking
twelve years ago. From an annual average of 753 strikes involving
297,000 workers in 1946. Annual average of man-days lost before
NRA: 10,828,000. In 1946: 116,000,000.

     Numerous people had numerous explanations, aside from the
Wagner Act, for this staggering and sometimes frightening
phenomenon. One of the reasons was the increase in employment.
But the House was certain that it had put its disciplinary finger
on the basic reason. The reason was not the U.S. worker --
"deprived," as the labor committee said, "of his dignity as an
individual . . . cajoled, coerced, intimidated and on many
occasions beaten up. . . . The employer's plight has likewise not
been happy." The committee blamed the unions, which the Wagner
Act had made into a "tyranny more despotic than one could think
possible in a free country." Congressmen were resolved to trim
down that tyranny. A minority of committeemen protested that the
bill would "result in bitter and costly strikes."

     Balance of Power. The bill had some holes in it; some of the
ground rules were vaguely defined. But essentially it
accomplished what Labor Chairman Fred Hartley jr. and his
committeemen wanted. It would restore the balance of power in
labor dealings to management, which, in the apparent opinion of a
majority of U.S. Congressmen, is where it belongs in a system of
free enterprise.

     Organized labor wailed in agony. William Green had declared:
"Hartley will be classified as one of labor's chief enemies."
C.I.O. spokesmen called the measure "a poisonous witches' brew."
Old New Dealers in Congress echoed them.

     The bill was still a long way from being law. On the other
side of Congress, Senator Robert Taft's almost equally tough
labor proposition had been flattened into a pancake by his own
committee. The Senate would be more cautious in its labor
legislation; in fact, some members of the House voted as they did
because they felt secure in that belief. But the House's
impressive vote also strengthened Taft, who now might be able to
restore much of his bill. But whatever happened -- a compromise
between the two houses, a possible presidential veto even of the
compromise -- the House action had thrown down a challenge to the
industrial U.S.


LABOR
New Mood

     The mood of the nation and the House was reflected in the
mood of labor. It registered with seismographic sensitivity in
Pittsburgh, where the C.I.O.'s Big Three had gathered.

     The United Electrical Workers' Jim Matles arrived,
brandishing a contract from Westinghouse, with the same $.15
raise U.E. had gotten from General Motors five days before.
Walter Reuther arrived, with a similar offer from G.M., but still
holding out for $.23 1/2.

     It all depended on Phil Murray's steelworkers. They had been
tied up in negotiations since January, had extended the deadline
once -- until April 30. Now time was running out. Both Murray and
Reuther were obviously piqued that management had stolen their
thunder by dealing first with the Red-wired electrical workers.
But the Big Three meeting broke up with no word of results.
Walter Reuther went back to Detroit, still breathing
intransigence.

     Phil Murray was conferring feverishly. There was a closed-
doors conference with U.S. Steel Vice President John A. Stephens,
an all night session with Stephens and other U.S. Steel
negotiators. Rumors of a settlement drifted out at the same time
that "No Contract, No Work" stickers appeared on steelworkers'
cars.

     Then Phil Murray made his announcement. Steel had settled
for slightly more than $.15. Murray had given up his demands for
a union shop and the annual wage, had promised not to press his
portal-to-portal pay suits; U.S. Steel "hoped" to hold the price
line.

     With the announcement, the whole labor picture changed. G.M.
promptly signed with 3,000 rubber workers in Dayton at the
magical new $.15 figure. At the least, it meant that Walter
Reuther would be hard put to it to avoid accepting about the same
terms at G.M., at Chrysler, and at Ford. At most it meant that
the U.S. could look forward to a season of real labor peace.

     Signs of Peace. There were already other signs that peace
was at hand. In Manhattan last week, 50,000 Western Union
employees tore up their $.25 demands, accepted a $.05 "down-
payment" raise. The oldest dispute in the nation was finally
settled: on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, which had
suffered more than five years of wrangling, Government seizure
and bloodshed, culminating in the murder of President George
McNear Jr.

     The one visible road block was the telephone strike. Even
that strike seemed to be crumbling around the edges. A.T. & T.
claimed it was handling four-fifths of the normal number of local
calls, that long-distance service was up to 35%. Telephone
workers were beginning to straggle back in many places: twelve in
Kosciusko, Miss; 1,500 Commercial Telephone Workers Union members
in New Jersey, pending arbitration and a constitutional test of
the state's drastic new anti-strike law; so many in the South
that Southern Bell had removed emergency restrictions from long-
distance calls.

     The N.F.T.W., which had started, without sufficient
strength, money or appreciation of the company's ability to keep
the phones going, was desperately sending up trial balloons. It
would be glad to take a $6-a-week wage boost and arbitrate
everything else. Picket-line tension grew. In Detroit two
strikers were injured and 22 arrested after a battle with police
and nonstrikers reporting for work. In Milwaukee, one fun-loving
picket paraded tauntingly in a baby buggy as a miserly "Ma Bell".

     At week's end, somewhat heartened by financial aid from the
C.I.O. and A.F. L., N.F.T.W. President Joseph Beirne appealed to
the White House for settlement help. He admitted to newsmen: "If
we don't settle by Monday, our people will still be out on
strike, but some of them may want to go back to work."

     A.T. & T. was still holding tight. But equipment was
suffering from lack of maintenance. As much as anything, it had
been waiting to see which way steel would jump. Now it had its
cue.


Loyalties

     For telephone workers of Woodward, Okla., the phone strike
ended the moment they could dig out from the debris of last
fortnight's tornado. While union officials ordered workers to
ignore the emergency and stay on strike, 30 union operators
rushed back to their jobs. Last week they made the strike's end
official, sent in their resignations with a blistering telegram:
"Girls refuse to stop. Will work as long as needed. . . . Would
be ashamed of a union which would put up pickets in a disaster
like this."

_________________________________________________________________
THE HOUSE LABOR BILL

     (Major points)

     1. Abolishes the National Labor Relations Board, substitutes
a Labor-Management Relations Board.

     2. Bans industry-wide bargaining.

     3. Bans the closed shop.

     4. Bans jurisdictional and sympathy strikes.

     5. Bans mass picketing.

     6 Bans all strikes by Government workers.

     7. Bars Communist union officers.

     8 Deprives violating unions of their bargaining rights for
one year.

     9. Deprives unlawful strikers of their right to get their
jobs back.

    10. Makes unions suable.

    11. Requires unions to make financial reports.

    12. Empowers the President of the U.S. to obtain injunctions
against interstate transport, communications or public-utilities
strikes.


June 30, 1947
LABOR
The New Law

     The Taft-Hartley Act-officially the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 -- is the first fundamental change in
labor-relations ground rules in nearly twelve years. By expert
analysis, these are some of the things it will do or not do:

     It will not halt strikes. The emergency procedure will only
affect nationwide strikes that threaten the national safety.

     But the new law should curb such strikes. Union leaders will
not be able summarily to call workers out, since the workers must
first vote by secret ballot on whether to accept the employer's
final offer.

     Since unions will be liable to suit for contract violation,
wildcat strikes will become unpopular. Jurisdictional strikes and
boycotts will be sharply curtailed by the NLRB's authority to get
injunctions.

     Employers will be able to speak freely to their employees on
labor policies, demand elections if they think the union no
longer represents the majority of their workers. Unions will be
required to act responsibly, will be held more closely to their
contracts.

     The power of union leaders to discriminate against
individuals will be curbed. Unions will be prevented from
arbitrarily excluding men from jobs; employers will have greater
freedom in hiring & firing as a result of the outlawing of closed
shops. Union shops will still be legal.

     Established unions will have some troubles. The new voting
rules, by giving craft and professional workers the right to
separate organizations, may tend to break up some C.I.O.-type
industry-wide unions into smaller craft unions like A.F.L.'s.

     The NLRB will have to be expanded. Its procedures will be
more complex.

     One loophole looked as big as a mine shaft; refusal to work
because of "abnormally dangerous" conditions was not considered a
strike. On June 30, John L. Lewis might find something dangerous
in every mine in the U.S.

     To the lawyer's eye, there seemed to be many another
loophole and many an arguable provision in the Taft-Hartley Act,
as there was in the Wagner Act. Final interpretation will only
come, as it did with the Wagner Act, after years of litigation in
the nation's courts.